Armed with its patent, Firm B usually can prevent Firm A from practicing the invention. In legal terms, Firm A, despite inventing and using the invention before Firm B obtained its patent, has no prior user rights. Would granting such rights be desirable? Current U.S. law provides for very limited prior user rights. Prior user rights are awarded only for patents involving business methods and then only if the prior user reduced the invention to practice one year before the patent application was filed. These provisions were added to patent law in 1999, evidently in response to concerns that owners of patents on business methods would assert those patents opportunistically against prior users of those methods. European law provides far more generous prior user rights. Congress is currently considering legislation (H.R. 2795) that would greatly expand prior user rights in the U.S. by awarding them for all patents and requiring only that the prior user "commercially used, or made substantial preparations for commercial use of, the subject matter before the effective filing date of the claimed invention." This paper explores the economic effects of awarding prior user rights. The analysis here abstracts away from the fine details of which party discovered the invention slightly before or after another, viewing slight differences in timing as essentially random. Formally, the various inventions are treated as simultaneous. With this abstraction, there is no fundamental difference between the independent invention defense and prior user rights.
For simplicity, suppose two firms are conducting R&D directed at the invention in question. The rules governing prior user rights only come into play if both firms successfully discover the invention. In that event, without prior user rights, each firm has a 50% chance of getting the patent, and thus a 50% chance of obtaining a monopoly over the patented invention. Denote the monopoly profits by M π and total welfare under monopoly by M W . In contrast, with prior user rights, both firms have the right to practice the invention, so a duopoly results. Denote the profits of the patent holder by P π , the profits of the prior user by U π , and total welfare with the resulting duopoly in the use of the invention by D W . We assume that combined duopoly profits are less than monopoly profits; in the case where . So, the ex post effects of prior user rights are straightforward. In the event that both firms discover the invention, prior user rights enhance competition, reduce joint profits, and increase total welfare. 
I. R&D Expenditure Levels with Independent Projects
Suppose that two firms are engaged in R&D competition, with each firm choosing how much to spend on R&D. Greater expenditures increase the chance of success, subject to diminishing returns. The cost of achieving a success probability p is given by ( ) C p with (0) 0 C = , '( ) 0 C p > , and ''( ) 0 C p > . Success by one firm is independent of success by the other.
Two patent policy instruments are available: patent lifetime, T, and the strength of prior user rights. For simplicity, suppose there is no discounting, the invention is useful during the time period [0, 1] , and the patent remains in force during the time period [0, ] T . After the patent expires, the market is openly competitive, so the firms earn zero profits and welfare is C W .
Stronger prior user rights are modeled by an increase in the probability,α , that prior user rights will be granted in the event that both firms achieve the invention. Stronger prior user rights correspond to policy changes that lower the requirements necessary for such rights to be granted, as Congress is currently considering. In the event that both firms discover the invention, each firm receives a flow payoff ( , , ) [
Theorem #1: Suppose that each firm chooses its R&D investment level, with greater investment increasing the chance of success, and with success at one firm independent of success at the other. Prior user rights are socially optimal if and only if the ratio of deadweight loss to profits is higher under monopoly than under duopoly.
Theorem #1 tells us that prior user rights are an attractive feature of the patent system so long as duopoly delivers returns to innovators more efficiently, in terms of the deadweight loss, than does monopoly. This finding fits very nicely with the deadweight loss to profit ratio test developed by Kaplow (1984) for patent and antitrust policy. Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) show that this condition holds if profits and welfare are concave in output. The Appendix shows how the ratio test in Theorem #1 changes if the patent holder also earns licensing revenues.
II. Diversification of Research Approaches
We now use the model from Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) to study how prior user rights affect firms' decisions to allocate their fixed research budgets across different R&D projects. Each of two firms can choose to adopt an approach that is less correlated with its rival, but doing so reduces its probability of success. Dasgupta and Maskin established conditions under which the market is biased towards overly correlated project choices, but did not study prior user rights. Higher values correspond to projects that are less likely to succeed: the probability of success for project z is ( ) p z , with (0) 0 p > , '( ) 0 p z < , and ''( ) 0 p z < . However, higher values of x and y correspond to research projects that are less correlated; the correlation between the two projects is given by 1 ( ) x y − + . For any given pair ( , )
x y we write the probability that both firms succeed as ( , ) B x y , and the probability that just the first firm succeeds as ( , ) A x y . We impose symmetry, so the probability that just the second firm succeeds is given by ( , ) A y x .
The first firm picks its project x to maximize ( , ) ( , )
Substituting into the first-order condition, we have
Since Intuitively, prior user rights reduce the return if both firms are successful and thus cause each firm to select a less correlated research approach.
The symmetric equilibrium is characterized by the condition: ( , ) ( , ) 0
Welfare is given by ( , , ) 
As usual, the direct effect of awarding stronger prior user rights is positive, so stronger prior user rights will raise welfare if their indirect effects are also favorable for welfare, which will be true if the market equilibrium is biased towards projects that are overly correlated.
Theorem #2: Suppose that each firm picks from a menu of R&D projects. Projects at one firm that are more likely to succeed are also more highly correlated with the other firm's projects. Strengthening prior user rights raises welfare if
For any given level of prior user rights, strengthening those rights raises social welfare if an individual firm is biased towards joint vs. sole discovery, in comparison with social welfare. The firm's tradeoff is reflected in the ratio / Corollary #2A: At least some prior user rights are socially optimal.
Since B π decreases with α and B W increases with α , the inequality in Theorem #2 will be satisfied for all values of α if it is satisfied at 1 α = . Therefore, we also have:
Corollary #2B: Full prior user rights are socially optimal if
Cabral (1994) shows that this condition satisfied in Cournot duopoly with linear demand and constant marginal costs. However, with homogeneous products and Bertrand competition, we have 0
, so this inequality is not satisfied. If competition is sufficiently severe, each firm will see little value in being one of two inventors, even though there is a social benefit of having two rather than one inventor. Therefore, full prior user rights can cause the market to be biased towards projects that are less likely to succeed but less correlated. In that case, the indirect effect of stronger prior user rights on welfare can be adverse. Even in that case, however, full prior user rights may be optimal due to their favorable direct effect.
III. Allocation of R&D Budgets Across Markets
We now ask how prior user rights affect firms' decision to allocate their fixed R&D budgets across markets. Following Cabral (1994), suppose that each of two firms can allocate its R&D budget between a smaller market, in which innovation is easier, and a larger market in which innovation is harder. Success by one firm is independent of success by the other.
A firm that allocates a fraction x of its R&D budget to the smaller market will achieve the innovation in that market with probability ( ) p x , where '( ) 0 p x > and ''( ) 0 p x < . The larger, market involves a lower probability of success, for any given level of R&D expenditures, but a proportionately larger payoff. In particular, if a firm allocates a fraction 1 x − of its R&D budget to the larger market, it will achieve the innovation in this market with probability (1 ) Suppose that the other firm is expected to allocate a fraction y of its budget to the smaller market. Therefore, the other firm is expected to succeed in the smaller market with probability ( ) f y and in the larger market with probability (1 ) / f y σ − . The payoff to the first firm of allocating a fraction x of its budget to the smaller market is given by
We study the symmetric Nash equilibrium in this R&D budget allocation game. Total welfare in a symmetric equilibrium is given by 2 2
(1 )
The Appendix shows that / 0 x α ∂ ∂ < , i.e., awarding stronger prior user rights causes the firms to shift R&D resources into the larger market. Since prior user rights only come into play if both firms succeed, stronger prior user rights tilt each firm towards the larger market, where discovery by its rival is less likely, so prior user rights are less likely to arise.
Therefore, awarding stronger prior user rights raises welfare if shifting the firms' R&D budgets towards the larger market increases welfare, i.e., if such rights correct for a pre-existing market bias against conducting R&D in larger markets where innovation is harder. Cabral (1994) proves the market is biased against R&D in the larger market if and only if
This is precisely the same condition that arose in Theorem #2 above, so we have:
Theorem #3: Suppose that each firm allocates its R&D budget between a smaller market and a larger market, in which innovation is more difficult. Stronger prior user rights cause the firms to shift their R&D budgets towards the larger market. Some prior user rights are always socially optimal. Full prior user rights are socially optimal if
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The inequality in Theorem #3 is satisfied with Cournot duopoly, linear demand, and constant unit costs, and more generally if duopoly competition is not too sharp. The inequality in Theorem #3 is sufficient, but not necessary, for full prior user rights to be optimal.
IV. Concluding Remarks
When nearly simultaneous, independent invention occurs, awarding one inventor a patent and the other the right to use the invention has very attractive properties. Competition is enhanced, innovation is rewarded with relatively little deadweight loss, and the private and social incentives to be the sole vs. joint inventor are generally better aligned than in the absence of such rights.
The attractiveness of prior user rights is even stronger if we take account of the fact that a single patent lifetime is set for all industries and inventions, despite huge differences across inventions in their expected profit to cost ratios. Prior user rights automatically reduce the rewards precisely for those inventions with a high profit to cost ratio, since these are the inventions most likely to be discovered simultaneously. They also are the inventions that the patent system is most likely to over-reward. From a Bayesian perspective, the fact that an invention was discovered independently by two or more parties is evidence that the profit to cost for that invention was relatively high, so reducing the reward based on market power is attractive.
The appeal of prior user rights is especially great today given mounting evidence that the patent system is out of balance, as argued by the FTC (2003), the National Academies of Science The main drawback associated with prior user rights is that they tend to encourage inventors to keep their inventions secret rather than disclosing them in patent applications. Denicolo and Franzoni (2004) develop a model in which a second party who duplicates and patents an invention that it knows had previously been discovered but kept secret should be granted the right to exclude the inventor from using its invention. However, the effectiveness of patent disclosures is in doubt, especially in industries where scientists and engineers are instructed not to read patents for fear of triggering additional liability for willful infringement. Plus, the current
Appendix

R&D Expenditures with Independent Outcomes
Discounting could easily be incorporated into this model by redefining T to represent the ratio of the value of an annuity that lasts for the lifetime of the patent to the value of a perpetuity.
A. Proof of Theorem #1
If the patent lifetime T, is set optimally, given α , we must have
The welfare impact of strengthening prior user rights is given by
We now proceed to establish that this inequality is met.
The left-hand side of this inequality is easy to calculate. As noted above, /
. From the definition of ( , , )
. Therefore, we have
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We now look more closely at the ( , )
p T α function to obtain an expression for the right-hand side of above inequality .
Using the condition that defines the symmetric equilibrium level of p, we get
So, we have
Substituting using (1 )
Collecting terms, this becomes
Inverting both sides and simplifying gives
Shapiro, Prior User Rights Appendix, Page 3 Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) show that the ratio of deadweight loss to profits rises with price is profits and welfare are both concave in output. Here we establish an alternative sufficient condition. The material in this section was developed jointly with Joseph Farrell. 
B. Ratio of Profits to Deadweight Loss
We look at each of these ratios in turn.
is the absolute value of the elasticity of demand. Inverting this equation, we get
We now look at the first-order approximations to '
for values of p near c. We express these in terms of m, which is zero at p c = .
Using the above calculation, we 
Both of these ratios approach zero as p c → . This reflects the fact that the deadweight loss is second-order small in p c − when price is near marginal cost. 
is increasing with p near p c = (and we are assuming all functions are smooth) . Call 0 p the lowest value of p at which
p c E p p − rises with p, then the ratio of deadweight loss to monopoly profits also rises with p for prices between marginal cost and the monopoly price.
C. Extensions to Theorem #1
Non-Essential Technology and Rent Shifting
The model just discussed assumes that a firm that is unsuccessful, or succeeds but lacks prior user rights, is excluded from the market and earns no profits. One extension would be to assume instead that each firm uses some older technology and is seeking to develop a new and improved technology, but that the new technology does not constitute a drastic innovation. In other words, if one firm has exclusive rights to the new technology, its rival using the older technology still imposes a competitive constraint (and may earn positive profits).
To study this case, we continue to normalize the profits and welfare to equal zero if neither firm achieves the invention, i.e., in the state ( , ) F F . However, it is no longer true that a firm that fails earns this same amount if its rival succeeds. Rather, such a firm is worse off, since it is facing a stronger rival. So, we need to introduce a new variable R which measures the rents shifted away from the firm that is excluded from using the new technology and towards the patent holder. These shifted rents are relative to the status quo. (We further assume that both firms return to their baseline payoff level of zero after the patent expires, just as we assumed above the both firms earn the same level of profits (zero) if the new technology is not discovered and after the patent expires.) Each firm has an enhanced incentive to increase its success rate, which either captures an extra R in rents or prevents the other firm from doing so. The Appendix establishes:
Corollary #1A: If the ratio of deadweight loss to profits is higher under monopoly than under duopoly, then full prior user rights remain optimal if additional rents are shifted to the sole inventor from its rival whose R&D program was unsuccessful.
Proof: There is no change in B π , which now equals (1 )(
function is given by ( , ) [ (1 ) 
Multiple Firms Engaging in R&D Competition
This model could be extended to include additional rivals conducting R&D in the same industry.
In the natural extension model, any successful firm that does not receive the patent is granted prior user rights. If m of the firms are successful in their R&D programs, prior user rights would transform a monopoly into a m-firm oligopoly. The natural conjecture is that granting full prior user rights in that model is optimal so long as the ratio of deadweight loss to total profits is smaller for any m-firm oligopoly than for monopoly.
Licensing to Other Industries
The analysis is virtually unchanged if the patent holder has licensing opportunities in other . So, the prospect of earning these licensing revenues increases the payoff from being the sole discoverer by L and increases the payoff from being one of two discoverers by / 2 L . In terms of our earlier notation, the monopoly profits rise by L as do the joint profits from dual discovery. 
For patents that can be licensed to third parties in other industries, the relevant ratios of deadweight loss to profits need to be adjusted to include the deadweight loss and revenues associated with the licensing activities.
Licensing Between Duopolists
Another extension would consider licensing from the patent holder to the rival, if that firm did not enjoy prior user rights. Such licensing would be optimal, and predicted to occur, if the joint profits from licensing exceed the monopoly profits used so far in the analysis. This could occur if the second firm brings important assets to the market. For example, that firm might own useful manufacturing assets or control certain brands or distinct products. In that case, the payoffs without prior user rights are no longer ( ,0) M π but rather ( , ) P N π π , where P π is the patent holder's profits and N π measures the profits of the firm that did not obtain the patent. Katz and Shapiro (1985) provide conditions under which one duopolist will license to the other.
If the two firms would negotiate a patent license in the absence of prior user rights, prior user rights effectively replace the licensing agreement that would be negotiated ex post between the two firms with a royalty free license, but only in the event that both firms achieve the invention.
As usual, prior user rights are attractive for consumers ex post. Theorem #1 suggests that prior user rights are optimal, so long as they lead to an outcome in which the ratio of deadweight loss to profits is less than in their absence, accounting for the negotiated licensing agreement.
Licensing to Other Firms in the Same Industry
Extending this model to include other firms in the same industry who will compete with or without the new technology is a more complex undertaking. Prior user rights, when they apply, create a second firm in the industry that can use the patented technology free of charge. The presence of such a firm will affect the incentives of the patent holder to license to the remaining rivals, and the willingness of these rivals to pay for a patent license. The analysis may vary depending upon the licenses studied: fixed fees, uniform running royalties, or two-part tariffs. We now provide a sufficient condition for the symmetric equilibrium to be the only equilibrium. 
